


This article was downloaded by:

On: 10 July 2009

Access details: *Access Details: Free Access*

Publisher *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Children's Geographies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title-content=t713410544>

'Endlessly Revisited and Forever Gone': On Memory, Reverie and Emotional Imagination in Doing Children's Geographies. An 'Addendum' to 'To Go Back up the Side Hill': Memories, Imaginations and Reveries of Childhood' by Chris Philo

Owain Jones ^a

^a Owain Jones, School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, University Road, Bristol BS8 1SS, UK.
E-mail: owain.jones@bristol.ac.uk

Online Publication Date: 01 March 2003

To cite this Article Jones, Owain(2003)'Endlessly Revisited and Forever Gone': On Memory, Reverie and Emotional Imagination in Doing Children's Geographies. An 'Addendum' to 'To Go Back up the Side Hill': Memories, Imaginations and Reveries of Childhood' by Chris Philo',*Children's Geographies*,1:1,25 — 36

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14733280302185

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14733280302185>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

‘Endlessly Revisited and Forever Gone’: On Memory, Reverie and Emotional Imagination in Doing Children’s Geographies. An ‘Addendum’ to “‘To Go Back up the Side Hill’”: Memories, Imaginations and Reveries of Childhood’ by Chris Philo

OWAIN JONES

Owain Jones, School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, University Road, Bristol BS8 1SS, UK. E-mail: owain.jones@bristol.ac.uk

ABSTRACT *The intention of this article is to expand some of the contexts and some of the conceptual and methodological trajectories presented Philo’s (2003) paper. In particular I explore the relationship of adulthood and childhood as articulated through memory and how this may impinge upon the practices of adults researching into, and writing about, childhood. The key and complex question of the otherness of childhood is raised through the questioning of the extent to which adults can imaginatively re-enter childhood. Differing forms of memory, and how these may interconnect with emotion and imagination in writings about childhood are explored as a means of trying to make connection with the conditions of childhood.*

... the ‘key elements in an individual’s autobiography’, as well as her or his primordial and recent body states, are represented within the brain—all of them constituting representations crucial to emotion (McKonkey, 1996, p. 61, citing Damasio, 1994).

Introduction

Given that Chris Philo’s work has been a source of inspiration to me (and others) I am very pleased to be able to write this ‘addendum’ to his paper “‘To go back up the hill’: memories, imaginations and reveries of childhood’ (Philo, this issue). This opportunity

has arisen because as Associate Editor I was asked to comment on a draft of the paper when it was first submitted to the journal. My response was lengthy, mainly as the paper sparked in me a number of avenues of thought, and, importantly for me, bridged between some ideas which were rather separate in my 'geographical imagination'. That response, for various reasons, has now become this 'addendum' to Philo's article.

Philo's paper raises intriguing questions about how adult researchers can approach researching childhood. It also raises issues about certain 'spaces' of childhood which have been neglected and/or are difficult to access in research terms, but which may offer important opportunities for accessing the worlds of childhood in ways sympathetic and insightful to children's views and experiences. Philo illustrates and develops these proposals by using the notion of reverie, and how Bachelard considers this as a means of somehow 're-entering' childhood.

Philo's paper is partly about the implications of adult researchers who are working in the area of childhood having once been children themselves. It is about the role of memory and imagination combined in bridging the 'gap' between adult (researchers') views of the world and those of children, and even crossing into the world of childhood once more. It is questioning how we can (and why we should) access children's worlds more fully and how adult reverie, as a very particular form of memory, may have a role here. In his quest for thinking about this, Philo also considers children's reveries, adult's reveries and the possible links between them. He also feels that reveries of childhood may be accessible through such things as the *repeated* story telling, playing and drawing that children often do when 'outside' adult direction (be it from parents, carers, educators, or researchers). Philo is also pointing to this work of Bachelard as a neglected piece of writing on childhood from an author whose work still has a significant presence in some notable geographical writing (see, for example, Anne Game (2001, p. 232) on Bachelard's *The Poetics of Space* and *The Poetics of Reverie*).

This 'response' (I am sure others will have other responses) orbits around a number of gravitational pulls and really should be seen more as an effort *to extend* the contexts and implications of Philo's piece rather than as a response *per se*. This is particularly so in terms of setting out some of the wider contexts of memory, and of remembering and writing childhood which Philo's paper hints at. My interests are also in the geographies of childhood and the roles and potentials that imagination, memory and emotion may have for thinking about/working with them. This interest was initially prompted by Raymond Williams's consideration of the complex process which is occurring when writers recall the landscapes of their childhood (see Jones, 1997). I received the first draft of Philo's paper between submitting an abstract to the 2002 'Emotional Geographies' conference in Lancaster (UK) and writing up the paper which was eventually presented there. Philo's paper immediately reshaped what I was trying to do and subsequently that presentation and others at the conference are now shaping further this 'response'. When thinking about children, childhood and its many geographies, and adult engagements with them, it seems to me there are extensive links to be made with the emerging ideas of emotional geography (see Anderson and Smith, 2001) and the ideas of geographers who are thinking about non-cognitive knowledges of emotion, unconscious and the body (Thrift, 2001).

Philo's paper hints at the importance and possibilities of investigation of the relationship between memory, imagination *and emotion* in doing children's geography (and in broader terms too). He details one particular type of memory event which may be a route into these rich landscapes. My aim in the subsequent sections is to add some further thoughts to these ideas by addressing ideas of memory as a methodology, then reveries, and then ideas of 'emotional imagination' which the notion of reverie seems to open up.

In so doing I draw in other writers who have been addressing these issues across a range of disciplines. These deliberations, I hope, expand the points of convergence that Philo (this issue) highlights with regard to my earlier attempts to address such issues (Jones, 2001) and also the points of difference between us which Philo also identifies.

On Memory as Methodology

There are few moments in which we are not steeped in memory: and this immersion includes each step we take, each thought we think, each word we utter. Indeed, every fibre of our bodies, every cell of our brains, holds memories (Casey, 1987, p. ix).

Memory is a vital ingredient of imagination, emotion, rational reflexivity, and the unconscious/consciousness self itself. As the quote from Casey indicates, or as Martin Buber put it, ‘to remember is to live’ (cited in Parkin, 1993). Memory is ‘on’ and working all the time, in our bodies, our subconscious, through our emotions. It reconfigures moment by moment who we are and how we function. Memory is not just a retrieval of the past from the past, it is always a fresh, new creation where memories are retrieved into the conscious realm and something new is created in that context. And, as Damasio (1999, p. 226) points out, we don’t control memory, we are not aware of it working in the same way as we are of conscious thought.

These are some of the wider contexts in which we can think of using memory as a ‘research tool’ and can think about this question of memory and children’s geographies that Philo raises. These contexts serve to suggest, initially at least, that any *straightforward* transportation back to previous states of being seems very unlikely. For various reasons which are set out below, the moments of reverie that Philo focuses upon, and other particular types of memories such as involuntary memories, and ‘body memories’ which *subvert* reflexive mental control, may well be especially important/useful in this respect. But before addressing those ideas I feel some more exploration of the wider context of memory and working with childhood is worthwhile here.

Philo notes that researching childhood as a form of otherness is unique because ‘we have all “been there” in one way or another, creating the potential for some small measure of empathy—some sense of recognition, sharing and mutual understanding’. This may be only ‘a fragment of connection’ but it offers an opportunity that researchers should explore given the difficulties of gaining ‘true’ identification with children’s feelings and understandings. (This whole debate is premised on the now widely accepted idea that academic understanding of children’s worlds, and the building of policies which deliver children their rights and a quality of life which does not merely correlate with the notion of ‘development’, rest in some part at least, on understanding the perspectives of childhood.) Philo uses Jones and Cunningham (1999) as an example of those who argue that memory *can* be a source of recreating ‘children’s geographies’. There are other accounts of children’s geographies which have relied on adult memories of childhood to research childhood rather than researching children themselves. For example Sibley (1995) uses mass observation data of adult memories to consider domestic geographies. Such seminal books as Ward’s (1990) *The Child in the Country* and Cobb’s (1977) *The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood* use adult memories of childhood experience to consider aspects of childhood; and so did numerous articles in the journal *Children’s Environments Quarterly* (e.g. Sobel, 1990).

Beyond geography, some clearly feel that adults can recall childhood in quite a full and vivid way and thus re-enter the child’s world. (Although there is obviously a wide

differential between individuals in this respect.) McConkey (1996) points out that Wordsworth in 'The two-part prelude' writes of being aware of 'Two consciousnesses—conscious of myself, and of some other being' (p. 313): the other being his childhood self, and this shows to McConkey that 'feelings from childhood remain undiminished within the adult's mind' (p. 313). The age of remembered childhood is critical here with the experiences of the very earliest years being pretty much lost and the middle years perhaps the most vividly recalled (McConkey, 1996). There is also the question of the age of the rememberers themselves, with some, say, first year PhD students working within a decade or so of childhood while other older academics have to gaze across a much wider, cluttered terrain of years.

But way beyond these variations lie all manner of complexities which Philo feels merit more consideration. As a start, Philo points to Atiken's (1994) use of Schactel's (1959) theory of 'childhood amnesia' which warns that true recollection of childhood is problematic. Stainton-Rogers and Stainton-Rogers (1992) also see this as being 'one of the deep paradoxes of finding out about childhood ... Having been children (and therefore having 'known' childhood at first-hand), and yet having no direct—only represented—access to that experience' (p. 19).

There is now an emergent literature on 'memory as a methodology' (see the collection edited by Radstone (2000) and that edited by Campbell and Harbord (2002)) which will help to develop this 'methodological debate' specifically in relation to childhood. From the former I quote (at length) Treacher (2000) who is addressing this question of memory and researching childhood in ways which engage with the issues that Philo raises:

Three particular dynamics need to be borne in mind when researching children and childhood. First, we have all been children and have experienced childhood with its particular joys, difficulties and challenges. We approach the research through having been there and one's own experience, needs, memories and personal and social narratives intervene in a loaded and evocative manner. Second, as an adult thinking about children's experiences one can be involved in searching for one's own lost childhood. The research can become a nostalgic search for that which is lost and gone, or indeed, that which may not have been there at all. As Steedman points out, the desire to discover the childhood of another can be the desire to rediscover and possess one's own childhood—a search or want that is bound to lead to disappointment, loss and dissatisfaction [Steedman, 1995, p. viii]. These emotional needs may impact on the research, on what is discovered or not, on what can be perceived and thought through or what has to remain absent. *The task is to listen and think as clearly as possible while carrying one's own emotional baggage and yet engaging in a creative act of projection and identification* [Steedman, 1995, p. ix]. Third, adults are researching children from a different vantage point—that of adulthood. Adults are in a different place, bearing different pressures, and facing social and emotional challenges. From this place we can disavow or idealise childhood experiences. Jordanova [p. 6] puts the difficulties pithily: '[we] are the products of societies that currently hold complex, deeply contradictory, and largely unarticulated views about childhood. Our capacity to sentimentalise, identify with, project onto, and reify children is almost infinite' (Treacher, 2000, pp. 135–136, my emphasis).

So Treacher's three points are as follows. That the otherness of childhood does create a significant 'distance' between adulthood and childhood across which it may be difficult for the adult researcher to travel. Studies of the brain, and its processes of mind, memory and consciousness, may cast some light on this matter. Greenfield (2000) feels that there

are profound differences between children's mental states and processes and those of adults because:

As we grow up and see the world increasingly in the light of previous experiences we develop a personalized inner world of private resources that increasingly act as a retaliatory buffer to the assault of the 'booming, buzzing confusion' that previously poured into our brains unopposed. And as we continue to live our lives as adults, more and more associations pile on and around the objects, events, and people among which we are thrown (p. 52).

Perhaps memory and particular memory events such as reveries and involuntary memory can somehow take us back into these former states and this is the question being explored here. Treacher then points out that this travelling may be further hampered by hauntings of the traveller's own childhood, and also by the spectres of the assumptions and blindnesses which modern western societies hold about childhood more generally.

So I do see in here some parallels with my concerns about the 'reachability' of the otherness of childhood (and the ethics of such a goal) (Jones, 2001). But Treacher does not offer some pessimistic abandonment of aspirations to make that journey and so there are also parallels with Chris Philo's hope that 'fragments of connection' can be made through (certain moments of) memory, and with his proposal that memory, together with empathy and imagination, are needed.

Perhaps some of the accounts which question the use of memory for understanding childhood, including my own (Jones, 2001), that Philo challenges, are too based in the realm of the rational, conscious, reflexive adult self, and Philo's emphasis on reveries, imagination and emotion maybe points to rather different and more appropriate ways of remembering childhood. As I have hinted at in my opening, a critical aspect here is the role of emotion. I will expand further on how children's lives are much more emotionally charged and thus their geographies are mapped in more emotional terms. I focus on the ideas of reverie and emotion in the next sections but here I will make a few more comments about ideas of memory and recalling children's worlds through their inevitable presence in literature.

Childhood Memories in Literature

There is a whole wealth of material in literature about remembered childhood which could be 'mined' for its tracings of childhood geographies. And there is some commentary on the processes of adult remembering and writing of childhood in literature and related literature studies. As memory inevitably involves looking back and thinking about one's previous life, it often ends up back in childhood, and literature is replete with examples of authors drawing upon, or trying to recreate, their past experiences either directly or indirectly, as their literary substance. Drabble (1984) has noted in her exploration of the relationship between English literature and place that many writers reveal 'a passionate attachment to the places of childhood' (p. 7) and most 'return again and again to childhood, seeing in a pond, a field, a tree, a church some reminder of what they once were' (p. 8). Gerrard (1997) notes 'the best [of these] stories takes us into a strange, familiar landscape of childhood that is terrifying, consoling, *endlessly revisited and forever gone*' (author's emphasis). And in that last, eloquent phrase (which I took as my title) is much of the conundrum that Philo and I are addressing in these articles.

Gerrard's words neatly capture the paradoxes and uncertainties of this process which at its heart has the profound complications that Treacher points to. This can be illustrated by the work of Raymond Williams, within his now famous analysis of images of *The*

Town and the Country. Williams (1985) considers the poet John Clare's lamentations for the loss of the countryside of his childhood through the enclosures and other agricultural developments of the 18th century. Williams extracts from the work of Clare that the 'primitive land' was 'being directly altered: the brooks diverted, the willows felled, in drainage and clearance' (p. 138). But he goes on to explore how the landscapes that Clare laments were the landscapes of his also lost childhood, *and it becomes uncertain which is being mourned*. This passage in Williams resonates with implications for thinking about remembering childhood geographies, where lost landscapes and lost previous selves come alive again in new forms, and become new and often emotionally charged entities. This is just one example of a more general trend in literature and adult memory more generally where, as Warnock (1987, p. 77) states, 'there is no doubt that this lurking figure, the lost youth, informs many of our memories'.

What has emerged from my engagement with these kinds of writings is that it is fruitless to get caught in any fixed or binary notion of 'possible or impossible' in terms of adults meaningfully remembering childhood—or 'lost landscape or lost self'—in terms of what it is which is mourned. These remembered, emotional geographies are hybrid, but indivisible, where the past and the present in terms of both self and landscape are present in new creations. But in the myriad remembered geographies which we all carry, traces and implications for all parties (the now self and past selves) may be present and these may include 'fragments of connection' back (in)to childhood that Philo anticipates.

Turning, briefly, to one of the most notable literary treatments of such themes, Proust's *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* (*Remembrance of Things Past*), Drabble (2000) suggests that this monumental work is an expression of the author's view of 'the artist's task as the releasing of the creative energies of past experience from the hidden store of the unconscious' (p. 820). The opening passages of *Swann's Way* (the first volume of the novel) describe the 'shifting and confused gusts of memory' (Proust, 1996, p. 6) of the narrator in a way which points to the extraordinary, continuous foldings of memories into present states (sleeping and waking) and to Damasio's point about the uncontrollable nature of memory. Drabble (2000, p. 14) suggests that the novel has a theme of despair based in part on 'the apparent irrecoverability of past experience' but also a more vindictory turn in 'the narrator's discovery that the past is, in fact, eternally alive in the unconscious' (p. 14). And here is perhaps where Philo's 'fragment(s) of connection' can be found, and reverie and involuntary memory (a recurring aspect of *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu*) a route to them.

Childhood Memories for the 'Now'

It is also worth noting that others too have been using ideas of memory and remembering childhood for rather differing objectives, but in ways which seem to illuminate possible links between adulthood and childhood. For Elspeth Probyn memory, and writing about memory, are the spatial rearrangements by which 'the past is bent into strange shapes so that what should be furthest away is in fact the closest' (1996, p. 113). She further adds that 'images of childhood, from childhood, pull us back to a space that cannot be revisited; they throw us into a present becoming, profoundly disturbing any chronological ordering of life and being' (p. 103). There is a different agenda here because Probyn hopes not so much to 'go back' to the world of childhood, but to 'bring forward' something of what it was to be a child back into adult life, in order to reclaim 'the singularities of childhood experience' and enact 'the deployment of childhood' (p. 100) in adult life.

Anne Game (2001) has also been exploring memories of childhood in her efforts in seeking an ‘eternal paradise, lived now’—a state of belonging and of connectedness within the here and now:

I feel childlike joy. And it feels right, I belong, my body is comfortable here, it fits. But the ‘it’ that feels right is both the specific experience and the childlikeness—I am at home in childlikeness or childhood, I am at home in this space, I belong (p. 228, my emphasis).

Here she also draws on Bachelard’s treatment of reverie and childhood to bring some form of ‘mythic childhood’ into adult life. And she does so in a way which seems an important endorsement of Philo’s approach. Game’s approach rests on the idea that meaningful connections can be made between these realms, ‘childhood is communicable: a soul is never deaf to this archetype ... when I say I feel like a child ... it is deep ‘within’ me, a primitive childhood we all share and, in some way, can’t avoid either’ (p. 263).

In a way, these ideas link into other ideas of childhood which can only be touched up here. Wordsworth has already been briefly quoted and the romantics clearly made a significant investment in trying to regain some kind of childlike vision. This has also been echoed in poststructuralist thinking:

... does *childhood* for Deleuze designate the glorious and perhaps unreal state of an overabundant and extravagant force, supple, elastic, capable of every metamorphosis, but doomed to dry up and settle down in the face of the received demands of the social and familial world? ... Isn’t childhood the name of vitality itself, of that force, captured at birth which we continually betray in ‘developing’ ourselves? (Zourabichvili, 1996, p. 211).

Although these rememberings are serving differing purposes, they are useful discussions on the *disconnections* and possible *reconnections* between childhood and adulthood and may, in the end, have implications for children’s geographies and the way children’s lives are structured in relation to adults. For Probyn says she is interested in:

A present wherein childhood is freed from its moral strictures, where children and adults are not stifled by the confines of a policed family, where grownups can write childhood, live childhood, in whatever order we wish, where we can happily bring up children if we so desire, where images of childhood brush up against other images, where the past quickens a lust for the present and for the possible (p. 123).

McConkey (1996) also thinks that ‘a heightened awareness of the exceptional influence of childhood experiences upon the later stages of life’ is possible, and that ‘such knowledge is important for self-insight, the way we treat our children, and for the amelioration of those conditions which [are] impairing the mental and physical growth of so many children’ (p. 314).

Other Kinds of Memories

Finally before we move on to ‘reverie’, a very particular form of memory, it is interesting to note that Anne Game (2001) is also interested in the function of the involuntary memories which I have already touched upon. These are moments of past time/experience which sometimes flash into our minds/bodies. Game stresses that such moments are not ‘willful recollections of the past’, but are ‘alive. Involuntary memory is a living past’ (p. 229). These types of memory events which ‘[return] one to the past,

making of it a timeless reality' (McConkey, 1996, p. 343) can take the form of *déjà vu* which 'in its strongest form saturates all present experience with recollective familiarity' (Hunter, 1964, p. 40) (even if the past being recreated is somehow 'fictional').

These differing types of memory events, along with reverie, and others (e.g. stream of consciousness, free association) open up the intriguing possibilities of using differing kinds of memory events in differing ways for differing purposes. Heeding McConkey's observation that we do not control or even understand memory in any straightforward way, these kinds of event may hold out possibilities for more non-representational kinds of 'research' which emphasise experiment and performance in a bid to break out of the confines of over-rational, representative knowledge.

On Reverie

Chris Philo's reflections and proposals relating to Bachelard's notion of reverie open up an intriguing space within these broader ideas of remembering childhood, where consciousness can slip back into a more dreamlike state, where the imagination, freed from the firm direction of focused thought and action, can begin to 'drift' back into all the remembered spaces, events *and feelings* which are stored in our minds (see opening quote). This may even serve as a form of 'wormhole' connecting between present and past states of mind where memory and imagination maybe can find ways 'back' into previous childhood states of reverie which were not dominated by the presence of adult direction.

So, more precisely, Philo is interested in adult reveries, children's reveries and in possible connections between them. The question of adult reverie is about how adult reveries might be a means of adults getting more in touch with the other worlds of childhood and the very other moments of childhood reverie. As well as the more general issues raised in the above discussion, some more practical questions need to be asked. Do all (adult) reveries take us back to childhood or just certain ones? Can adult reveries constitute a form of return to a childlike state and/or to particular times of lived childhood? Can adult reveries be induced and directed (to some extent at least) and recalled in some kind of thought experiment?

HAMPL (1985) considers ideas relating to this when she discusses writing memory in a way which is not driven by the 'the grating wheels and chugging engine of logic' but which is instead ruled by the heart—the guardian of intuition with its secret, often fearful intentions [whose] commands are what the writer obeys' (p. 206). Consequently Hampl professes to be 'a strong adherent of the first draft' where thoughts *well up*. If adult reverie does constitute a break from the directed, driven logic of conscious reflexive thought, and if it allows the mind to work with differing kinds of material stored in our memories and unconscious, such as feelings, somehow remembered by mind and body together (see Weiss below), then these do seem to offer possibilities.

The second interest is in children's reveries themselves and how to research them by using their everyday undirected stories, drawings and play activities. As I read the proposal for studying children's drawings, I wondered, given the struggle and slowness of drawing and writing for younger children (and for just about everyone in relation to the swiftness and fluidity of the imagination), how far can this go? But our two children do repeatedly draw certain themes and objects, and these must represent 'places' where their thoughts often take them. (We have also wondered and worried about what to do with the hundreds of 'documents' our children generate and the value thereof.) These are easy to dismiss as conveyors of little import because of the assumption of the children's lack of drawing expertise. But Philo's ideas about studying such everyday material seem

rich in possibilities. When children's drawings *are* used for research they are often commissioned and thus directed, to some extent at least, by the adult driven research process. Clearly there are also therapies and techniques for using children's drawings to help them to reveal and deal with trauma and abuse, and a related literature on interpreting children's drawing (e.g. Luquet, 2000) and it would seem appropriate for researchers to make some connections with those.

There is much made of the need for children to have their own private, physical spaces to occupy and control. Reveries, daydreams and 'idle times' seem to me to be the mental equivalent and/or accompaniment to those physical spaces. And just as there is concern for the loss of such physical spaces there is some concern for the loss of 'reverie spaces' for children as they become increasingly bound up with information and technologies and the inevitably adult prescribed worlds of games, videos, and television, and as they face the pressures of audited education and commodified lifestyles.

Although reverie is not the same as 'doing nothing' there are, I think, some connections with this idea which has received some attention in childhood studies. Aitken in *Geographies of Young People* (2001, pp. 16–17) talks of the importance of, and research significance of, children just doing nothing or 'idle time'. He refers to work on groups of children just 'hanging around'. Maybe this is the social or group 'relative' of the solitary reverie, where collective thoughts and discussions and collective bodies can *wander at random*. Along with a child's solitary reverie, these are children's worlds at their most other, where children are imaginatively and maybe physically most free from adult directed agendas. Massumi (1992, p. 104) considers the child's daydream as an 'other' ('derelict') space to striated adult order:

The derelict space is a zone of indeterminacy that bodies-in-becoming may make their own. Autonomous zones of this kind come in many guises. They may be geographical ... or they may be entirely deterritorialized ... Daydreaming is an autonomous zone for the 'delinquent' in school.

This means that these states of being may be central to the otherness of childhood, so as Philo suggests, researching these moments may be an important part of thinking about children's physical and imaginative geographies and understanding this may be key to supporting their continued availability to children. But, by the same token, these moments represent childhood at its most remote from adult perspectives. So I feel that we should remain *very alert* to the question that as these places are almost 'adult free zones' by definition, how can adults as researchers enter them without shattering their spell? (Like an adult trying to crawl into a small, fragile 'den' built and occupied on the small (to us) bodily scale of children.)

Conclusions: On Emotional Imagination–Memory

Arguably, children's lives and the geographies thereof are more immediately emotionally structured:

Small children seem to live on an emotional roller coaster ... Children laugh on average 300 times a day. By adulthood, this number plummets to 50. But by the same token, a child will be more readily frightened by a creak on the stair (Greenfield, 2000, p. 51).

This is because their response to emotional stimulus is not flattened by the memory of experience. Children are still literally 'finding their way in the world' in a very obvious sense. As Mantel (1997, p. 5) puts it:

... children are struggling to get a fix on the world ... Knowledge is revised from moment to moment, often from second to second ... Every moment the world shifts, and you shift within it [as] childhood brings continual change, tiny crises every day.

For adults to go back to these worlds in their own memories, or enter them through studying children and what they do, there needs to be some suspension of 'the chugging engine of logic' (Hampl, 1985, p. 206) and an entering into a state where feelings and emotions are more to the fore.

Thrift (2001) proposes the notion of the body as consisting of a series of 'leaves' which are all the differing engagements it is having with the environment around it. I want to point out these leaves are constantly turning onto one another as they become memory. Those leaves which are laid down, in the habitual moments, in our conscious memories, in our unconscious memories, are traces of previous states of beings, both the narratives and feelings thereof (see opening quote by McConkey, 1996).

Memories according to Hampl (1985) consist of image and feeling, the event and the response to that event. And perhaps herein lie possible 'fragments of connection'. Again examples can be found from those considering memory and writing. Toni Morrison, according to McConkey, has stressed that when remembering and remembering to feed her writing, she first and foremost responds to the emotions of some past encounter rather than the narrative of that encounter. So, for example, if one is trying to consider, say, the body geographies of child-parent interactions, an attempt to remember, to relive *the feelings* of security, or love, or rejection, or violence is likely to be an important part of gaining a living understanding of that childhood body geography.

We can remember the narrative of some event, but we can't remember the reading of that narrative, but perhaps we can remember the feeling that came with the reading of it, so perhaps we can recall through *feeling*. And the body may play an important role here:

... previous body images remain accessible and can be re-enacted in a moment as when we return to a childhood 'haunt' and find ourselves simultaneously haunted by an earlier body image that was able to negotiate the childhood space with ease. These earlier body images are also projected onto our own children as we watch their fascination with/dread of their own bodies as we find ourselves inhabiting their ways of living their bodies as the emotional center of the world (Gail Weiss, 1999, p. 33).

The relationship between memory and imagination that Philo stresses seems important not only in this context but in the wider context of the much discussed 'geographical imagination'. As Mary Warnock (1987, p. 76) writes, 'We could say that in recalling something, we are employing imagination and that in imagining something, exploring it imaginatively, we use memory. There can be no sharp distinction'. And McConkey feels they are so interconnected they should form a hyphenated term. We should all try to be aware of our geographical memories not just in terms of the specifics of dealing with children's geographies, but also in terms of how these geographies internalised into our minds and bodies inform our theoretical and empirical predilections and our understandings and feelings about space-time. But to return to the issue of somehow remembered childhood. Our imagination needs to work with our memory and we need to recall the feelings and emotions themselves, as far as is possible, as well as narrative accounts of events. We need our memories to work in the first person and not the third person. To return to Proust's *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu*, as an ending, McConkey (1996, p. 191) feels the famous passage about going to party at the Guermantes' shows how:

... memory can put us back in touch with ‘the essence of things’, with what is beyond time itself. In this passage, we see the importance of imagination to memory, the intertwining of the two that makes the memory an event superior to the event itself; and the reason that ‘the true paradises are the paradises we have lost’.

Acknowledgements

Thanks for Chris Philo for his original article and tolerating this ‘addendum’ to it. Thanks to the editors for encouraging this idea. Thanks is due, again, to Chris and the editors for their comments on an earlier version of this article. I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Board for their funding of research grant ‘Putting Children in Their Place: a History of Cultural Representations of the Landscapes of Childhood’ as part of which this paper was developed.

References

- Aitken, S. (1994) *Putting Children in Their Place*, Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers.
- Aitken, S. (2001) *The Geography of Young People: the Morally Contested Spaces of Identity*, London: Routledge.
- Anderson, K. and Smith, S.J. (2001) Editorial: emotional geographies, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 26, 7–10.
- Campbell, J. and Harbord, J. (eds) *Temporalities, Autobiographies and Everyday Life*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Casey, E. (1987) *Remembering: a Phenomenological Study*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Cobb, E. (1977) *The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dasmasio, A. (1994) Descartes’ error and the future of human life, *Scientific American*, 271, 105.
- Dasmasio, A. (1999) *The Feeling of What Happens: Body Emotion and the Making of Consciousness*, London: William Heinemann.
- Drabble, M. (1984) *A Writer’s Britain: Landscape in Literature*, London: Thames and Hudson.
- Drabble, M. (ed.) (2000) *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Game, A. (2001) Belonging: experience in sacred time and space, in: May, J. and Thrift, N. (eds) *Timespace: Geographies of Temporality*, London: Routledge.
- Gerrard, N. (1997) The way we were: review of *The Faber Book of Contemporary Stories about Childhood*, Moore, L. (ed.) *Observer*, Review, 12 January.
- Greenfield, S. (2000) *The Private Life of the Brain*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hampl, P. (1985) Memory and imagination, in: Hunt, D. (ed.) *The Dolphin Reader*, Boston, MA: Houghton, 1003–1014.
- Hunter, I.M.L. (1964) *Memory*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Jones, M. and Cunningham, C. (1999) The expanding worlds of middle childhood, in: Teather, E.K. (ed.) *Embodied Geographies: Spaces, Bodies and Rites of Passage*, London: Routledge, 27–42.
- Jones, O. (1997) Little figures, big shadows: country childhood stories, in: Cloke, P. and Little, J. (eds) *Contested Countryside Cultures*, London: Routledge.
- Jones, O. (2001) ‘Before the dark of reason’: some ethical and epistemological considerations on the otherness of childhood, *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 4(2), 173–178.
- Jordanova, L. (1989) Children in history: concepts of nature and society, in: Sarre, G. (ed.) *Children, Parents and Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 3–24.
- Luquet, G.-H. (2000) *Children’s Drawing*, London: Free Association Books.
- Mantel, H. (1997) Memories are made of this, review of *The Faber Book of Contemporary Stories about Childhood*, Moore, L. (ed.) *Sunday Times*, Books, 12 January.
- Massumi, B. (1992) *A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- McConkey, J. (ed.) (1996) *The Anatomy of Memory: an Anthology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parkin, A. (1993) *Memory: Phenomena, Experiment and Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Probyn, E. (1996) *Outside Belongings*, London: Routledge.
- Proust, M. (1996) *Swann’s Way. Volume One of In Search of Lost Time*, London: Vintage.

- Radstone, S. (ed.) (2000) *Memory and Methodology*, Oxford: Berg.
- Schachtel, E. (1959) *Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory*, New York: Basic Books.
- Sibley, D. (1995) Families and domestic routines: constructing the boundaries of childhood, in: Pile, S. and Thrift, N. (eds) *Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation*, London: Routledge.
- Sobel, D. (1990) A place in the world: adults' memories of childhood's special places, *Children's Environment Quarterly*, 7(4), 5–12.
- Stainton-Rogers, R. and Stainton-Rogers, W.S. (1992) *Stories of Childhood: Shifting Agendas of Child Concern*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
- Steedman, C. (1995) *Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority 1780–1930*, London: Virago.
- Thrift, N. (2001) Still life in nearly present time, in: Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. (eds) *Bodies of Nature*, London: Sage.
- Treacher, A. (2000) Children: memories, fantasies and narratives: from dilemma to complexity, in: Radstone, S. (ed.) *Memory and Methodology*, Oxford: Berg.
- Ward, C. (1990) *The Child in the Country*, London: Bedford Square Press.
- Warnock, M. (1987) *Memory*, London: Faber and Faber.
- Weiss, G. (1999) *Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporality*, London: Routledge.
- Williams, R. (1985) *The Country and the City*, London: Hogarth Press.
- Zourabichvili, F. (1996) Six notes on the percept (on the relation between the critical and the clinical), in: Patton, P. (ed.) *Deleuze: a Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell.